This paper investigates whether transactions where the buyer (or the seller) always moves …rst, and the seller (or the buyer) always moves second in the exchange gives higher payo¤s than exchanges in which it is randomly determined who moves …rst. We examine the e¤ect of two treatment variables: Partners versus Strangers and …xed versus changing positions. We …nd that both with …xed and with changing positions, second movers take advantage of their position by exploiting the …rst mover by "not delivering" the demanded good. However, with …xed positions exploitation occurs signi…cantly less while reciprocal exchanges happen more often. In spite of this, it turns out that with …xed positions payo¤s are very unevenly distributed. Unequal payo¤ distributions occur both under Partners and Strangers, but they appear to be more extreme among Strangers.
Introduction
If in the US a consumption good is purchased on delivery, or a hotel reservation is made, the customer has to give guarantees that (s)he is able to a¤ord the expenses by giving a credit card number, or by simply paying in advance. In European countries, like the Netherlands, the customer will usually pay after delivery without him/her being asked for evidence of his/her …nancial standing before delivery. In labor relations an employer, in trying to …ll a vacancy, usually o¤ers a new worker a wage before the actual work e¤ort of the worker is known. If the employer-worker relationship turns out to be more or less permanent, the employer can react to the worker's e¤orts by o¤ering wage increases.
The transactions in these examples have in common that they are of a sequential nature. That is, after ordering a good some time elapses before consumption can take place or, in the case of the labor-market example, before the e¤ort of the worker can be established. One of the two market parties involved moves …rst after which the other party moves. As a consequence, the …rst mover has to put con…dence in the second mover that he will respond to her …rst move in a reciprocal way. For instance, if a good or service has been paid for by the buyer, it is uncertain whether the supplier will actually deliver the good or service demanded or whether the quality of the good or service is as expected. Or, the other way round, if a supplier has delivered …rst, she has to await whether payment will follow suit. In game-theoretic terms we could say that in these exchanges there is priority in time and priority in information.
It might be added here that in the real world con…dence in the realization of a transaction can be engendered by the existence of some warranty institution. Holiday trips are a case in point: potential demanders can only infer from a brochure the quality of the o¤ered accommodation and its surroundings. For that reason quite often these trips are sold alongside with a claim for the buyer for a refund if the quality of the lodging or the venue does not …t the description of the brochure. For the kind of transactions that we have in mind, however, such a warranty does not exist and if it did, it would not be e¤ective as for the consumer the (money and time) costs of claiming a refund surpasses the expected reimbursement. By the same token, suppliers as …xed …rst movers, as is the case e.g. with mail-order houses, sometimes do not legally enforce payments from defaulting customers, as the transaction costs involved are larger than the amount of money to be claimed.
It has been observed in a variety of (experimental) settings that subjects are inclined to behave reciprocally by rewarding nice acts and punishing unkind behavior (e.g. Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger (1996), Camerer and Thaler (1995) ; see Fehr and Gächter (2000) for a survey). The employment relationship is a case in point. Usually an employer …rst commits herself to paying a certain wage to a worker, after which the worker chooses an e¤ort level. For the worker there is an incentive to shirk, which for the employer, who should anticipate this behavior, implies that she will commit herself to paying the reservation wage only. Experimental evidence shows, however, that employers make quite generous o¤ers, while workers are on average willing to put forward extra e¤ort above what is implied by purely pecuniary considerations (e.g. Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993)), even under conditions with a rather high stake level or in very competitive double auction markets (for a survey, see Fehr and Gächter (2000) and the references therein).
In the labor market, the demand side (the …rm) usually moves before the supply side (the worker) by o¤ering a wage contract without exact knowledge of the e¤ort to be provided by the worker. On the US consumer market the demand side usually has to move …rst (e.g. by producing a credit card number), while on the European consumer market the supply side has to move …rst (by delivering the demanded goods or services).
Thus, the order of the moves is …xed: in some markets the buyer will always have to move …rst, and in other markets the supply side is assigned to be the …rst moving party. The question presents itself whether such role assignments have some economic justi…cation.
Will it help to improve exchange and to raise e¢ciency if demand and supply have a …xed role in concluding a transaction, i.e. by always having the same side of the market moving …rst, and the same side of the market moving second? Or, will it ameliorate exchange if the role assignment is subject to change, i.e. sometimes one side of the market has to move …rst, and sometimes the other side of the market has to move …rst?
A related question is whether the impact of the role assignment depends upon the permanency of the relationship. Typically, customers will stay in a certain hotel only once in their life, but the relationship between an employer and an employee has a more enduring character, and a changing role may then be more conducive to successful exchange than a …xed role.
In this paper we try to answer the questions alluded to above by experimental data.
It is not the purpose of the paper to explain which side of the market will get the …rst-or second-mover position in exchange. Our experiments do not allow for the identi…cation of the "supply side" or the "demand side" of the market. We use an experimental repeated bilateral exchange game where both sides of the exchange are in a symmetrical position in that they can o¤er their counterpart a certain part of their endowment. The (sequential) exchange game allows for reciprocal exchange. The unique Nash equilibrium involves no exchange. We relate the characteristics of exchange to two treatment variables. The …rst one is the so-called Partners/Strangers treatment, which has often been found to be a determining variable for the (non)emergence of voluntary cooperation. 1 In the Partners 1 The Partners and Strangers treatments were introduced by Andreoni (1988) in a public good experiment to distinguish between simple learning and strategies. Surprisingly, he found that Strangers contribute more to the public good than Partners do. Replications of this study found, however, that Partners contribute more (Croson (1996) ) or that there is no signi…cant di¤erence (Weimann (1994) ). The general concencus seems to be that in most situations Partners are more inclined to behave cooperatively. treatment, players play the game repeatedly against the same opponent. In terms of our examples above, labor relations can typically be named as the real-world counterpart of this treatment. In the Strangers treatment, players are randomly rematched after each round: players meet the same opponent occasionally with random probability, but typically the next opponent will be a di¤erent one than the current one. Hotel stays are an example of this treatment. It can be argued that cooperation is likely to be facilitated when repeated interaction takes place with the same opponents (Partners) rather then with varying opponents (Strangers) (see e.g. Van der Heijden et al. (2000) ).
Taking this conjecture for granted we investigate whether the position of the players has an independent e¤ect on the emergence of cooperation. To that end we introduce the …xed/changing position as a second treatment variable. Under …xed positions one player is the …rst mover during all repeated plays (rounds), whereas the other player is always the second mover. Under changing positions, it is randomly determined in each round who is the …rst and who is the second mover. We investigate whether or not …xed positions are conducive to obtaining higher payo¤s and/or more reciprocal exchanges.
In the next section we brie ‡y introduce our experimental game and procedure. The third section presents our results. We …nd that both in the …xed and the changing treatments second movers take advantage of their position by exploiting the …rst mover by "not delivering" the demanded good. Yet, in the …xed treatments second movers are signi…cantly less engaged in exploiting their strategic advantage. This renders the guess justi…ed that …xed positions are more conducive to generating reciprocal exchange than changing positions. On the other hand, as with changing positions an exploited subject can become an "exploiter" when she happens to get into the second-mover position, the average …rst mover in a …xed treatment is (signi…cantly) worse o¤ than the average individual with changing positions. In the Partners treatment with …xed positions even the average second mover is not better o¤ than the average individual with changing positions. As a result, for Partners it will unambiguously increase the average payo¤ if exchange takes place under changing positions. Among Strangers, the result will not be that clear-cut. Converting exchange with …xed positions into exchange with changing positions will on average bene…t the …rst mover signi…cantly, but the second mover will on average signi…cantly lose from such a conversion. Section 4 contains a summary and a concluding discussion.
2 Game and experimental procedure
The game
The experiment is based on a sequential exchange game (Van der Heijden et al. (1998) ).
In this game, the payo¤-function P is given by
where T i (T j ) is a transfer from player i (j) to player j (i), i; j = 1; 2, i 6 = j.
The exchange game can be given the following interpretation: In period 1, player 1 has an endowment of 9, which she can use to "buy" a good, i.e. by "paying" an amount
In the second period player 1 has an endowment of 1. In this period, player 2 can use his endowment of 9 to "deliver" the good by giving T 2 to player 1
Player 2 knows the size of T 1 before he has to decide on T 2 . Endowments, payment T 1 and delivery T 2 together determine the …nal asset levels of the two players in the two periods. In the period in which player i pays or delivers T i , his …nal assets are 9 ¡ T i . In the period in which player i receives T j as a payment or a delivery, player i's …nal assets are 1 + T j . The payo¤s to player i are de…ned as the product of the …nal assets levels in the two periods, as shown in (1).
We employ a 2£2 factorial design, with treatment variables matching structure (Partners versus Strangers) and position (…xed versus changing positions). Under Partners, subjects are matched with the same opponent for all rounds to be played, whereas under Strangers, subjects are randomly rematched at the beginning of each round. In the …xed treatment, subjects are assigned to be player 1 or player 2 for all rounds to be played, while in the changing treatment, it is randomly decided at the beginning of each round whether a subject is player 1 or player 2 in that round.
The experimental procedure
In total 16 sessions of the sequential exchange game were run in Tilburg, the Netherlands, in March 1995 and in April 1996. 3 All sessions were run with eight subjects, which gives a 2 Both buyer-seller examples mentioned in the introduction are covered by this design. One interpretation of the game is that in the …rst period player 1 pays a certain amount and that in the second period player 2 delivers the good with a certain value/quality (the US case). Alternatively, in the …rst period player 1 delivers the good and in the second period player 2 pays for the good (the European case). In both situations it can occur that player 1 receives less (or more) than expected or hoped for. I.e. in the …rst situation, player 2 can deliver a good with a lower (or higher) value/quality and in the second situation, player 2 can pay less (or more) than the value of the good. To keep the exposition clear, we use the …rst interpretation (the US case) in the remainder of this paper. In addition, for sake of convenience, we refer to T as the transfer. 3 The experiments presented here are part of a research project investigating the relationship between inter-and intragenerational gift exchanges. total of 128 participants. A session typically lasted for about an hour. The subjects were undergraduate and graduate students from Tilburg University. They came from various disciplines like law and psychology, but the majority studied economics or business. 4 Participants were mainly recruited by an announcement in the University Bulletin and by posters. None of the participants had previous experience from any related experiment and none of them participated more than once.
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly seated behind computer terminals, which were separated by partitions. Instructions, reproduced in the Appendix to this paper, were distributed and read aloud by the experimenter. After that, subjects got several minutes to study the instructions more carefully and to ask questions. Then one practice round was played.
After the practice round, the eight subjects played 15 repetitions of the exchange game. At the start of the session, four couples were formed in the Partner treatments.
These persons remained paired during the remaining part of the experiment. In the …xed treatment, the role was also determined at the start, whereas in the changing treatment, this role was randomly assigned at the beginning of each round. In the Strangers treatments, subjects were randomly rematched each round. Here, the role was also assigned each round again in the changing treatment, whereas the players' roles remained unchanged in the …xed treatment.
For each couple, player 1 decided on her "payment" T 1 to player 2. After that, player 2 was informed about T 1 and he had to decide on the "delivery" T 2 to player 1. Earnings of player i in each round (P i ) were denoted in points and calculated according to equation (1) . Subjects could also use a table included in the instructions (see Appendix), which gave P i as a function of T i and T j . Subjects knew that a total of 15 rounds would be played and that after the last round the points earned in all rounds would be accumulated and transferred into money earnings at a …xed known rate.
After 15 rounds, an anonymous questionnaire asked for some background information (gender, age, major, and motivation). After that, subjects were privately paid their earnings in cash and left. In addition to the earnings from the experiment, which were calculated by multiplying the total number of points earned by 5 cents, the participants received 5 Dutch Guilders for showing up in time. 5 In the Strangers treatments, all eight players interact, which gives, strictly speaking, only one independent observation per session. In the Partners treatment, the players interact in …xed pairs, and thus each session generates four independent observations. 4 We have not found any signi…cant di¤erence in behavior between business or economics students and other students. 5 At the time of the experiment, one Dutch Guilder was about $0.50. Expected earnings, based on previous experience of the experimenters, were somewhat higher than what students could earn with one hour of work in, for instance, a bar. Table 1 displays the features of each treatment combination, their abbreviations, and the number of sessions, subjects, plays and independent observations. 3 Experimental results
Introduction
Before presenting the main results we will …rst brie ‡y discuss some predictions for our game. Obviously, as the game under consideration is of a sequential nature, in each treatment it is a dominant strategy for player 2 to give nothing, i.e. T 2 = 0, if we assume sel…sh, money-maximizing subjects. For player 1, on the other hand, it is not a dominant strategy to give nothing because she has to anticipate player 2's reaction to T 1 . However, a backward induction argument leads to the unique equilibrium outcome of
This subgame perfect Nash equilibrium yields a payo¤ of 9 to both players. It is clear that players forego considerable gains from exchange by playing non-cooperatively. For instance, a level of exchange of 2 would result in a payo¤ of 21 for both players. When both players choose 4, the optimal symmetric payo¤ of 25 is achieved.
Previous experiments with the same game and experimental studies with related games suggest that players often succeed in obtaining higher payo¤s than predicted by the Nash equilibrium (Van der Heijden et al. (2000), Fehr and Gächter (2000)). Furthermore, if one assumes that players are not only motivated by pecuniary considerations, but for instance also by altruism, reciprocity or distributional concerns, other outcomes than the Nash equilibrium of T 1 = T 2 = 0 might be expected. For example, if we apply Fehr and Schmidt's model on inequity aversion 6 to our game, it turns out that, depending on the parameter values of inequity aversion, the predictions contain all symmetric outcomes, 6 Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume in their model that there are purely sel…sh individuals and individuals who dislike inequitable outcomes. Individuals of this latter type experience not only a loss in utility if they are worse o¤ (in material terms) than the other subjects but also if they are better o¤ (but then the loss is smaller).
i.e. T 1 = T 2 = k, if the …rst mover has perfect information on the type of the second player. If the …rst mover has some a priori information on the probability of meeting an inequity-averse (or reciprocal) opponent, she might earn more than implied by the Nashoutcome by o¤ering a non-zero transfer every round, if this probability is su¢ciently large. 7 Hence, on the basis of previous experimental results as well as theoretical work, we may expect to see some degree of cooperation in our game. The relevant and interesting question then is whether we should expect to see di¤erences among the experimental treatments under consideration. In this paper we focus on the impact of role assignment, i.e. we are interested in the question whether exchanges and payo¤s are enhanced when players have the same position all the time or when they change positions. Secondly, we want to see whether this e¤ect di¤ers between Partners and Strangers. 8 As argued earlier, if we assume that all subjects are sel…sh, money-maximizing players the prediction is the same for all treatments, i.e. no exchange. This prediction may change if players are motivated by other concerns.
In the Partners treatment, subjects are matched with the same subject for all rounds.
This makes it easier to know the payo¤s of the partner, such that subjects who are concerned about inequity may try to avoid an unequal distribution of the payo¤s. The e¤ects of …xed or changing positions can point in di¤erent directions. On the one hand, with …xed positions coordination of strategies may be somewhat less di¢cult, which is likely to make cooperation easier. On the other hand, with …xed positions the …rst player will not be able to directly "punish" a non-cooperative second player, although she will …nd out pretty soon what type her second-moving partner looks like, or is trying to mimic. One might therefore expect that in this case non-cooperative actions by the second player will induce the …rst player to have recourse to stopping all transactions.
With changing positions, however, a …rst mover is less vulnerable to exploitation as she can …nd compensation for her loss later on when she happens to be in the second-moving position. As a result, …rst players can allow themselves to be more "tolerant" towards uncooperative acts of her partner. Fixed positions will thus more likely be characterized by less exploitation and more Nash-exchanges than changing positions.
Subjects in the Strangers treatment are matched with a di¤erent person in each round.
As noted above, if in the …xed treatment at least some second players can be expected to act cooperatively, it can be bene…cial for …rst players to give positive transfers. A …rst 7 To see this, suppose that …rst movers perceive a probability p of meeting an inequity averse individual who will reciprocate a received transfer by a transfer of the same size. Even if …rst movers are sel…sh and only care about their own expected payo¤ (so that they will maximize E(P 1 ) = p(9 ¡ T 1 )(1 + T 1 ) + (1 ¡ p)(9 ¡ T 1 ) they set a non-zero T 1 as soon as p > player in both the …xed and the changing treatment then runs the risk of being exploited by a zero return gift of the second player. But, again, a …rst player in the changing treatment can take more risk and is more likely to o¤er higher transfers in order to incite higher return transfers than a …rst player in the …xed treatment. This leads one to expect higher transfers by …rst players in the changing treatment. On the other hand, inequity averse second players in the …xed treatment will know that …rst players cannot make up for losses in later rounds. As a result, they will sooner reciprocate …rst players' gifts than if they were in a changing treatment. Previous experiments with the exchange game have indeed shown that under changing positions there is a considerable degree of exploitation by second players, i.e. T 2 < T 1 (see Lensberg and Van der Heijden (1998) ). Assuming that in both the …xed and the changing treatment a certain percentage of the subjects will endorse non-cooperative behavior, the above reasoning suggests that the (absolute) di¤erence between T 1 and T 2 will be smaller under …xed positions than under changing positions. Note, however, that this smaller di¤erence can be due to higher transfers by …rst players in the changing treatment, or to larger transfers by second players in the …xed treatment.
In the next section we will see to what extent these predictions prove to be correct. Table 2 gives the average transfer (T ) and the average payo¤ (P ) by player position for each treatment, averaged across all sessions and all rounds. Observation 2 : On average, players 1 earn less than players 2. This di¤erence is signi…cant in all treatments, except for treatment P-ch.
Results
Under Strangers the average payo¤ of second players is about twice as high as the average payo¤s of …rst players (for both S-…x and S-ch a non-parametric Wilcoxon test
shows that this di¤erence is signi…cant at p = 0:04). In treatment S-ch this di¤erence does not necessarily cause unequal payo¤s between players, but for treatment S-…x this leads to a very uneven distribution of the payo¤s. Also for P-…x the average payo¤s to …rst players are signi…cantly less than the average payo¤s to second players, while in P-ch the di¤erence is considerable but not signi…cant (p = 0:07 and p = 0:20 for treatment P-…x and P-ch, respectively).
[Insert Figure 1 ]
The above observations about the average payo¤s suggest that among Strangers the payo¤s per individual are more unequally distributed in S-…x compared with S-ch. In particular, …rst players in S-…x will have lower payo¤s than the second players in S-…x, and, by implication, also lower payo¤s than the "average" player in S-ch. This inequality also exists in the Partners treatment, given the obtained signi…cant di¤erence between the payo¤s of players 1 and 2 in P-…x. More information about the distribution of the payo¤s is depicted in Figure 1 , which shows the Lorenz curve. In this …gure, the subjects have been ranked according to (increasing) payo¤s. The horizontal axis shows the proportion of the participants (ranked to their payo¤s) and the vertical axis the proportion of the payo¤s earned by any given fraction of the subjects. In S-…x 50% of the players with the lowest payo¤s earn in total just slightly more than 30% of the total earned payo¤. In S-ch, the latter percentage is almost 41%. In the Partners treatments these percentages are 38 (P-…x) and 43 (P-ch), respectively. This leads to: It is obvious that being the …rst player in S-…x is a very unfavorable position. For instance, the average payo¤s of …rst players range from 9 to 19 whereas the lowest average payo¤ for second players is 17, and the highest average payo¤ is as high as 38. For P-…x an analogous conclusion can be drawn, although in that treatment the di¤erence is less clear-cut: the distribution of payo¤s for the second player is somewhat more concentrated between 25 and 35, while for the …rst player the average payo¤s is concentrated on values between 11 and 28.
It will be clear that a …xed position in a transaction appears to hurt the …rst player, who is exploited to some extent. In spite of this, we observe that exchanges do occur in the …xed treatments. See Tables 3a-3d, which give the cross-tabulations of the decisions of …rst and second players (T 1 and T 2 ) for each treatment separately.
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If we de…ne the situation in which 0 < T 1 < 5 and T 2 = 0 as being "no deliveries" and 0 < T 1 < 5 and 0 < T 2 < 5 as "reciprocal deliveries" 10 we get: 9 The average values of T 1 and T 2 are reported in Table 2 . Mann-Whitney tests yield that none of these averages are signi…cantly di¤erent between the …xed and the changing treatments. 10 "Reciprocal deliveries" could also emerge as a result of inequity aversion. Here, we do not distinguish between these two distinct motivating forces for reciprocity. For the sake of simplicity we just talk about "reciprocal deliveries" instead of "reciprocal or inequity averse deliveries".
Observation 4 : The frequency of "no deliveries" is lower and the frequency of "reciprocal deliveries" is higher in the …xed treatments compared to the changing treatments. The frequency of "no deliveries" amounts to 96 (or 32%) in S-…x against 136 (or 45%) in S-ch. "Reciprocal deliveries" occur in 107 (36%) against 60 (20%) of the cases, respectively. Thus, the treatment with …xed positions lends itself more easily to a cooperative attitude and …rst players are less vulnerable to exploitation ("no deliveries") by the second player. Only the observed di¤erence in exploitation is statistically signi…cant (p = 0:02, using a Mann-Whitney U test).
Among Partners the frequency of "no deliveries" equals 16 (9%) in P-…x versus 45
(25%) in P-ch whereas "reciprocal deliveries" take place in 54 (30%) and 42 (23%) of the cases, respectively. These distinctions are the same as those in the Strangers treatment.
The Nash-equilibrium of "no exchanges" (T 1 = 0 and T 2 = 0) shows a di¤erent picture among Partners and Strangers, however. Among Strangers, "no exchanges" occur less often in the …xed treatment compared to the changing treatment (63 against 78 cases, or 21% versus 26%) whereas they occur more often among Partners (49 against 21 cases, or 27% versus 12%). Also in the Partners treatment, only the di¤erence in "no deliveries", i.e. exploitation, is signi…cantly di¤erent between P-…x and P-ch (p = 0:01, using a
Mann-Whitney U test).
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For Partners these results conform to our expectations formulated in Section 3.1. We claimed that if under P-…x the second player chooses not to deliver (i.e. 0 < T 1 < 5 and T 2 = 0), the …rst player will sooner stop trying to complete a transaction and will rather not go into any transaction at all. Support for this claim can be obtained from inspection of the individual data. Among P-…x we observe 9 times "no deliveries", followed by T 1 = 0 in the next round, while in P-ch this can be observed 3 times. In 3 out of the 9 cases of "no deliveries" in P-…x, one can interpret this as an endgame e¤ect. In one couple, the …rst player tries to enforce transactions …ve times. If these attempts turn out to be unsuccessful, she resorts to Nash behavior. In the other situations of "no deliveries"
we observe that afterwards the second player invests large amounts in order to rebuild trust. The other couples in P-…x behave more or less in a reciprocal way. In half of these "reciprocal" situations both players fully cooperate and their payo¤s are about equal, whereas in the other half the second player slightly exploits the …rst one.
Among Strangers …rst players …rst need to have insight in the "average" behavior in the group. As we noted in Section 3.1, if some players are expected to act reciprocally (or to be characterized by inequity aversion) …rst players might be inclined to invest during the whole game. In particular, …rst players will not quickly lose con…dence in getting a return gift as the gain in case of a a return gift is relatively large. In S-…x we observe only three times that the …rst player decides to quit going into transactions after receiving "no deliveries" during a couple of rounds. Moreover, all but one …rst players start with spending. We further observe cooperative behavior to a large extent in this treatment. In three out of the …ve sessions the second player almost automatically behaves reciprocally, albeit the second transfer generally is below the …rst transfer's level. But, what also matters is that the second player obviously expects the …rst player to invest. If she does not, she is "punished" by T 2 = 0. This punishment behavior is nicely illustrated in one of the sessions. One of the …rst players consequently gives 0 and
Another interesting observation from Tables 3a-3d is that several exchanges can be observed with T 1¸5 or T 2¸5 , in particular among Partners. Exchanges of the type (T 1 ; T 2 ) with T 1¸5 ; T 2 · 3 or T 1 · 3; T 2¸5 can be called complex exchanges. They need a lot of coordination but they result in high (total) payo¤s. It is beyond the scope of the present paper to explain this type of complicated behavior. Van der Heijden et al. (2000) investigate the occurence and evolution of di¤erent types of exchanges.
she almost always receives nothing. Conversely, the other 3 …rst players in that session
give a positive transfer and in general they receive a positive transfer. So, the payo¤ of these three (…rst-moving) players is considerably above that for the one Nash-playing …rst player.
For the changing treatments we argued that …rst players can take more risk, even though the likelihood of becoming exploited is sizable. Indeed, players seem to be conscious of the possibility of exploitation by the second player, but they are also conscious of the opportunity changing roles o¤er to compensate losses incurred as a …rst player, as we frequently observe what might be called "alternating no deliveries". By this we mean the process in which a subject, while being the second player, does not deliver (and consequently exploits) and while being the …rst player does not receive "deliveries" in spite of a positive transfer (and consequently is being exploited). In P-ch, 8 out of the 12 couples can be characterized by "alternating no deliveries", 2 by (almost complete) reciprocal behavior and 2 by (partial) one-sided exploitation. Except for the last two couples, all couples realize a rather high payo¤, albeit full cooperative behavior would result in even higher payo¤s. In S-ch we observe some 15 out of 40 subjects playing "alternating no deliveries". Here, indeed, …rst players are aware of the risk of exploitation (as some 40% of them turn out to be exploiters when being second players themselves), but they are nevertheless induced to give positive transfers in the role of …rst player. Table 4 shows, for each treatment, the di¤erence between …rst and second transfers
It leads to:
Observation 5 : In the …xed treatments the di¤erence between …rst and second transfers is smaller than in the changing treatments.
The entries in the table indicate whether the di¤erence is about equal (jT 1 ¡ T 2 j · 1), For both Partners and Strangers the average absolute di¤erence between T 1 and T 2 is signi…cantly smaller in the …xed treatment than in the changing treatment (p = 0:03 in both cases), i.e. transfers are more equal in the …xed treatment.
As noted earlier, Observation 5 might be explained by the more risky behavior of the …rst player in the changing treatment. An alternative explanation is that in a …xed treatment inequity averse second players will not permit large di¤erences with …rst players to arise. The latter explanation …ts the data better than the …rst one: …rst players' gifts do not di¤er signi…cantly between the …xed and changing treatments (see fn. 9). As a result, it follows that second players in the changing treatment are more engaged with making up their lossed incurred as …rst players in earlier rounds, while in the …xed treatment second players reciprocate more. In conclusion, we …nd that no deliveries in the changing treatments occur more frequently and more intense than in the …xed treatments. In S-…x …rst players o¤er the opportunity to become exploited by consistently giving positive transfers, but on average this is bene…cial compared to having recourse to Nash-exchange. Moreover, we observe some coherent reciprocal behavior among the groups in this treatment, also favoring …rst players. In P-…x, however, …rst players can more easily …nd out what type of individual their partner is (or mimics) and they will earlier stop trying to conclude a transaction if they know their partners' type. As a results, less exploitation occurs.
Summary and concluding discussion
In evaluating the e¤ects of …xed positions in bilateral exchanges positive and negative elements can be observed. On the positive side, one consequence of having a …xed position is that a player gets specialized in behavior. Returning to one of our real-world examples from the introduction: a consumer in the US just knows that without a credit card in her pocket she will never be able to conclude any transaction. Therefore, showing a credit-card as a …rst move is known to be inextricably bound up with any exchange.
Specialization leads to cooperative behavior in a relatively large number of cases as has been demonstrated by our experiments: in the treatments with …xed positions the number of reciprocal exchanges is higher (but not signi…cantly higher) than in the treatments with changing positions. Strikingly, among Partners …xed positions imply a larger percentage of no exchanges as well. This can also be interpreted as the consequence of specialization inherent to a …xed position. If roles are …xed, the …rst mover will be in a weaker position than the second mover, as she (the …rst mover) can act, but not immediately react whereas the second mover can respond. However, she can leave the initiative to the second mover in letting him show whether he adheres to a cooperative attitude, or not.
The second mover has to "work harder" in a P-…x treatment to convince the …rst mover of his willingness to increase her pay-o¤ compared to the Nash-equilibrium. If he fails to convince her, the …rst player will quit trying to conclude transactions. This makes her less vulnerable to exploitation by the second player. Indeed, one of our …ndings is that sel…sh reactions from second movers occur less often if the players are in a …xed position.
The "specialization" argument therefore contributes to explaining typical …ndings on labor-market experiments where workers (second movers) show reciprocal behavior to a non-negligible degree.
On the negative side, however, it is de…nitely the case that being in the …rst position in all rounds gives a player an unfavorable position. This holds especially for exchanges among Strangers. Due to exploitation …rst players in treatment S-…x earn considerably less than second players (13.1 versus 24.6, see Table 2 ). With changing positions a player is randomly assigned to the …rst or second position in each round, and the overall average payo¤ is 18.8. So, being in a …xed …rst position among Strangers leads to lower average payo¤s of 5.7 (=18.8-13.1). In P-…x …rst players also earn less than second players, but here the di¤erence is less pronounced (19.5 versus 22.3). Yet, the loss in earnings due to being in the …xed …rst position is almost the same as among Strangers (namely 5.0, which follows from 24.5, the average earnings in treatment P-ch, minus 19.5). Among Partners, moreover, the second mover will not lose if the …xed-role assignment were converted into a changing-role assignment: his (average) payo¤ will then increase from 22.3 to 24.5.
These calculations suggest that a …xed position in exchange does not result in larger total (or societal) welfare. Among Strangers the total welfare after exchange, measured by the total payo¤ of both players together, is about equal in our experiments, irrespective of the …xity of positions. Among Partners changing roles even renders larger welfare. As we suggested above, under …xed roles the second mover has to "prove" being cooperative before the …rst mover is willing to show a cooperative attitude as well. In a number of cases the con…dence of the …rst mover in her partner was not induced, and she stuck to giving no transfers at all. If positions are changing players start exchanging earlier and keep on exchanging longer as non-cooperative behavior by a second mover can be "punished" by the …rst mover later on while being in the position of the second mover.
Moreover, non-cooperative acts can be "tolerated" by the …rst mover as the second mover might not have had the chance to learn to act cooperatively due to her being in di¤erent positions every new round.
On balance, although most experimental studies on exchanges with a sequential character take …xed positions for granted 12 , our experiments suggest that …xed positions in 12 One of the few exceptions is a paper by Forsythe, Lundholm and Reitz (1999). In their …nancial market experiment, subjects can be assigned to di¤erent roles: sellers, who know true assets qualities, or buyers, who only know the quality distribution of the assets. They …nd that sellers are willing to act as cheaters, even if they have been cheated before in the postion of a buyer. This result is similar to our …nding that second movers are willing to exploit …rst movers, even if they themselves have been exploited before. In one of the experiments reported in Güth, Huck and Rapoport (1998), subjects switch roles too. However, their results are hard to compare to ours as in their independent moves game each subject had each role only once, and the order of play was not truly sequential. Instead, they applied a positional order protocol, in which there was priority in time, but no priority in information.
exchange do not generate unambiguous advantages compared to changing positions. In real-world markets, …xed positions appear to be the rule as well. This raises the question as to why in our experiments …xed positions do not show up as the dominant treatment.
For the answer to this question one must probably take account of the way changing or …xed positions are actually determined. In our experiments with changing positions the computer decided which party had to move …rst in each transaction. In the real world one might not expect that some kind of lottery determines who gets the (favorable) second position in each exchange if the positions are not …xed. Rather, the determination of the position will most likely be part of some negotiation process. One determining factor for the outcome here will be the market power of the two sides of the market.
If the supply side is the dominant force, it might enforce the most favorable role from the weaker demand side. If the economic power of both sides of the market is more level, negotiations on the role might entail transaction costs which are prohibitive for the conclusion of transactions. In that case, one might conjecture that some evolutionary process will wipe out many (if not all) transactions where a …xed-mover rule is absent.
The investigation of the development of transfers when individuals can bargain about their position will be the subject of future research.
Introduction (read aloud only)
You are about to participate in an experimental study of decision-making. The experiment will last for about one hour. The instructions of the experiment are simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you may earn a considerable amount of money. All the money you earn will be yours to keep and will be paid to you, privately 
Instructions (distributed and read aloud) Decisions and earnings
The experiment exists of …fteen separate rounds. In every round, each of you will earn a certain amount of points. At the end of the experiment the points earned in the 15 rounds are added up for each participant separately. Every point earned is worth 5 cent (¼$0.028) at the end of the experiment. In addition to this, all participants receive a …xed extra amount of D ‡ 5. Your total earnings will thus be equal to D ‡ 5 plus the number of points earned times 5 cent. Now, we describe how the points earned in each round will be determined.
In each round you will be matched with another participant. Each round will consist of two periods. In every round you have in one period the role of Decider and in the other period the role of Receiver. The earnings of a participant in a round are determined by the …nal assets of a participant in the period in which he or she is a Decider, and by the …nal assets of the participant in the period in which he or she is a Receiver. We denote the …nal assets as Receiver by EO and the …nal assets as Decider by EB. The earnings in points of a participant in a round are determined by the product of the …nal assets as Receiver and the …nal assets as Decider. The earnings of a participant in a round are thus equal to EB £ EO points. Next, we describe how the …nal assets as Decider EB and the …nal assets as Receiver EO are determined.
In each round the participants are …rst randomly matched two by two. After that the computer determines for each couple who will be the Decider in the …rst period and who will be the Decider in the second period. In the second period the roles are reversed:
the Decider in the …rst period is thus the Receiver in the second period and the Receiver in the …rst period is the Decider in of the second period. The Receiver starts with an endowment of 1, whereas the Decider starts with and endowment of 9. The Decider has to decide which part of his or her endowment he or she wants to transfer to the Receiver.
This transfer, which we will denote by T, is 0 at the minimum, and 7 at the maximum.
After the Decider has decided about the transfer T to the Receiver, the …nal assets of the Receiver are EO=1+T, and those of the Decider are EB=9-T. After the Decider has decided about her or his transfer to the Receiver, the second period of the round will be started, in which the roles are reversed.
In the second period, the other participant of the couple, who is the Decider now, will have to make a decision. The determination of the …nal assets of the new Receiver and Decider in this period is similar to the previous period. The Receiver starts with an endowment of 1 and the Decider starts with an endowment of 9. The Decider decides again on the part of her or his endowment that will be transferred to the Receiver. This transfer T determines the …nal assets of both participants in the second period: EO=1+T for the Receiver and EB=9-T for the Decider. When the two period in a round are over, so when both participants have decided on a transfer, a new round will be started.
Procedure and usage of the computer
After we have gone through the instructions, …rst a practice round will be run. After the practice round, the …fteen rounds that determine your earnings for this experiment will be run.
In every round the computer, in a completely random manner, …rst determines who will be matched to whom. Then the computer determines, again in a random manner, for each couple who will get the role of Receiver and Decider in the …rst period. On the upper left part of the screen the Decider will see the number of the current round and the message " You are now Decider in the …rst period". Underneath the Decider will seethe question "How much of your endowment do you transfer (0-7)?" The Decider has to type an integer from 0 up to and including 7. The number typed is the transfer T to the Receiver with whom he has been matched in this round.
Next, the current Decider will be asked the question "How much do you expect to receive?". Here, the Decider types an integer from 0 up to and including 7, dependent on her or his expectation about the transfer she or he expects to receive as Receiver in the next period. This expectation is used by us when analyzing the experiment, but your earnings will be una¤ected by it. Besides, the other participants are not informed about your expectations stated.
After all Deciders have made a decision, the …rst period is over. In the second period the Receivers of the …rst period are now the Deciders. Every new Decider will see on the screen that in this round he or she is Decider in the second period and how much he or she has received in the previous period. Underneath there is the question "How much of your endowment do you transfer (0-7)? The Decider has to type an integer from 0 up to and including 7. The number typed is the transfer T to the Receiver with whom he has been matched in this round. When all Deciders of the second period have made a decision all participants will see how much they have received and what their earnings for the rounds are. These earnings are in points and are equal to the product of the …nal assets as Decider and the …nal assets as Receiver: EB £ EO. After one has been informed about this, the round is over and a new round will be started.
In the new round, the computer again determines …rst who will be matched with whom and next for each couple who will be the …rst Decider. So, you do not know with whom you are matched in a particular round and whether you will be the …rst or the second Decider.
Summary
The experiment consists of 15 rounds, and every round consists of 2 periods. In each round the participants are randomly matched two by two by the computer. In each round every participant has in one period the role of Decider and in the other period the role of Receiver. When you are Decider your endowment is 9 and your …nal assets depend on your transfer T to the Receiver: EB=9-T. When you are Receiver your endowment is 1 and your …nal assets depend on the transfer T by the Decider to you: EO=1+T.
Your earnings in points in a round are determined by the product of your …nal assets as Decider and your …nal assets as Receiver: EB £ EO. After the …rst period of a round is over the new Deciders are informed about the transfer T which they have received in the …rst period. After both periods in a round have been …nished, everybody is informed about the transfer T to him or her and his or her earnings in that round.
The matching of the participants and the order in which participants are Decider in the two periods of a round are determined by the computer in a completely random way time after time. You will never be able to know whether you will be the …rst or the second Decider in a particular round, or with whom you are matched in a particular round.
Final remarks
After the last round, you will …rst be requested to answer some questions to evaluate the experiment. This questionnaire is anonymous. We can link your answers to your seat number but not to your name. After that, you will be called by your seat number to receive your earnings privately and con…dentially. Your earnings are your own business; you do not need to discuss with anyone. It is not allowed to talk to or communicate with other participants during the experiment in either way.
On your table you will …nd an empty sheet, which you can use to take notes. Additionally, you will …nd a sheet labeled "REMARKS". On this sheet you can make remarks about the instructions or your decisions.
You get a couple of minutes to go through the instructions and to ask questions.
When you want to ask something, please raise your hand. One of us will come to your table to speak to you.
After that we will start the practice round.
Are there any questions? 
